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The question how best to communicate monetary policy decisions remains a 
highly topical issue among central banks. Focusing on the experience of the 
European Central Bank, this paper studies how explanations of monetary policy 
decisions at press conferences are perceived by financial markets. The empirical 
findings show that ECB press conferences provide substantial additional 
information to financial markets beyond that contained in the monetary policy 
decisions, and that the information content is closely linked to the characteristics 
of the decisions. Press conferences indeed have on average had larger effects on 
financial markets than even the corresponding policy decisions, and with lower 
effects on volatility. Moreover, the Q&A part of the press conference fulfils a 
clarification role about the economic outlook, in particular during periods of 
large macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
JEL No.: E52, E58, G14. 
Keywords: monetary policy; financial markets; real-time analysis; press 
conference; communication; European Central Bank. 
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The way central banks communicate with the public has seen dramatic changes in 
recent decades. There is a clear tendency to provide more information, and to do so in 
a much more timely fashion. Not only do central banks communicate more about their 
policy objectives (for instance by adopting quantitative goals, such as definitions of 
price stability) and their strategies, the way central banks communicate their monetary 
policy decisions has also evolved considerably. In general, enhanced communication 
and transparency is widely argued by both policy-makers and academics to have 
improved the effectiveness of monetary policy considerably. Further modifications to 
current practices are in the making, with a number of central banks, including the 
Federal Reserve – which in 2006 appointed an FOMC subcommittee on 
communication – currently debating whether and how to modify communication 
practices.  
 
An interesting recent case in point is the decision in May 2007 by the Swedish 
Riksbank to increase the frequency of press conferences and hold a press conference 
after each policy meeting in order to “provide more detailed and more regular 
information.” Moreover, the press conference will obtain substantially more weight in 
the Riksbank’s communication strategy as it was decided at the same time that there 
should in general be no further communication on monetary policy intentions in 
speeches in the inter-meeting periods. 
 
Whereas it is nowadays common practice to announce policy decisions immediately 
by means of a press release, central banks have adopted various approaches as to how 
policy decisions are explained to the public. One relatively recent and, as also the case 
of the Riksbank shows, increasingly important approach has been the introduction and 
use of press conferences, where monetary policy decisions are explained in detail, and 
journalists are given the chance to ask questions to the central bank officials. With a 
couple of years of experience with press conferences as a communication instrument, 
it is now possible to evaluate their usefulness. This paper analyses the case of the 
ECB’s press conferences, which have been part of the ECB’s communication tools 
right from its inception in January 1999, taking a financial market perspective. It 
focuses on two central questions: first, to what extent do the press conferences 
systematically add relevant information to explain given decisions? And second: do 
press conferences provide additional information, beyond that explaining a given 
decision, in particular about the state and outlook of the economy?  
 
The main findings of the paper can be summarised as follows. Overall, press 
conferences have systematically added information about ECB policy decisions as 
well as about the underlying state of the economy. In fact, the size of the market 
reaction to press conferences is on average substantially larger than the reaction to the 
policy decision itself, while press conferences at the same time exert smaller effects 
on market volatility. The market reaction to a press conference is related to the 
characteristics of the decision: the less well a decision has been anticipated by the 
market, the stronger is the reaction to the introductory statement. This suggests that 
the statement contains relevant explanations for the reasons underlying the decision, 
which helps clarify the market participants’ interpretation of the decision. Beyond this 
explanation, no further clarification of the given decision is required, as on average 
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preceding decision.  
 
More specifically, the paper asks to what type of information and statements markets 
react during press conferences. It shows that statements made during the press 
conference containing a reference to inflationary developments are strong market 
movers. Furthermore, responses to questions regarding rate discussions at the 
Governing Council meeting have substantial effects on markets. Other statements, e.g. 
about the economic outlook, second round effects, or money growth are important as 
well, yet not as consistently as those about inflation and rate discussions.  
 
Finally, the paper analyses whether the Q&A session, probably the most distinctive 
characteristic of the press conference relative to a press statement that is released on 
the central bank website, is able to clarify the views of the public about the current 
decision and the future course of monetary policy. It gives journalists the opportunity 
in real time to digest the information provided through the decision and the 
introductory statement, to compare it with their own prior information, and to ask 
questions on those issues that need clarification. While the Q&A session does not 
systematically add information beyond that given in the introductory statement, a 
clarification role is indeed apparent in the data, as financial markets show large 
movements under specific circumstances.  
 
In particular, we focus on directional changes in financial market movements during 
the Q&A compared to the reaction to the policy decision. We find that such a 
directional change is less likely to occur if the decision itself contains a lot of 
information (such as when it surprised markets or interest rates were changed). 
Directional changes are more frequent when there is a high degree of uncertainty 
among market participants about the state and outlook of the economy. Under 
situations of elevated macroeconomic uncertainty, the market response to the release 
of the monetary policy decision itself is muted, suggesting that market participants 
wait for the clarification provided during the press conference. Thus, in line with this, 
the paper finds that the Q&A session is indeed playing a clarification role in particular 
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1. Introduction 
The way central banks communicate with the public has seen dramatic changes in 
recent decades. Further modifications to current practices are in the making, with a 
number of central banks, including the Federal Reserve – which in 2006 appointed an 
FOMC subcommittee on communication – currently debating whether and how to 
modify communication practices. Market speculation persists that possible changes 
could include the more frequent use of press conference as a communication tool (e.g. 
Bloomberg 2006). An interesting recent case in point is the decision by the Swedish 
Riksbank to hold a press conference after each policy meeting in order to “provide 
more detailed and more regular information.” Moreover, the press conference will 
obtain substantially more weight in the Riksbank’s communication strategy as it was 
decided at the same time that there should in general be no further communication on 
monetary policy intentions in speeches in the inter-meeting periods.
1 
 
Overall, there is a clear tendency to provide more information, and to do so in a much 
more timely fashion. Not only do central banks communicate more about their policy 
objectives (for instance by adopting quantitative goals, such as definitions of price 
stability) and their strategies, the way central banks communicate their monetary 
policy decisions has also evolved considerably. In general, enhanced communication 
and transparency is widely argued by both policy-makers and academics to have 
improved the effectiveness of monetary policy considerably.
2  
 
Whereas it is nowadays common practice to announce policy decisions immediately 
by means of a press release, central banks have adopted various approaches as to how 
policy decisions are explained to the public. One relatively recent approach has been 
the introduction of press conferences, where monetary policy decisions are explained 
in detail, and journalists are given the chance to ask questions to the central bank 
officials.
3 Regular press conferences to explain monetary policy decisions are 
currently held by the central banks of the Czech Republic, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as by the European Central Bank 
(ECB). An alternative approach has been to provide only a short statement on the 
decision on the meeting day, followed by the release of minutes with a significant 
time delay, usually a few weeks later. This approach is currently employed in 
particular by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. 
 
With a view to the ongoing reassessment of communication strategies of central 
banks, and having gained some experience with press conferences as a 
                                                 
1 On 11 May 2007, First Deputy Governor Irma Rosenberg declared that: “Firstly, press conferences 
will in future be held after each monetary policy meeting, regardless of what decision has been taken. 
… By […] holding press conferences after each monetary policy meeting the Riksbank will provide 
more detailed and more regular information on the considerations taken by the Executive Board.” 
Moreover, she stated: “The Executive Board has come to the conclusion that there is not normally any 
reason to indicate how the repo rate will be set in speeches and press releases issued prior to the 
monetary policy meetings. Our assessment is that it is enough to signal our intentions clearly in 
connection with the seven monetary policy meetings held every year.” (Riksbank 2007) 
2 This point is stressed by a number of important studies – though this list is by no means exhaustive – 
including Bernanke (2004), Blinder (1998), Goodhart (2005), Issing (2005), Reinhart and Sack (2006), 
and Woodford (2005). 
3 With the notable exceptions of the Swedish and Swiss central banks (both of which hold infrequent 
press conferences), the introduction of regular press conferences dates back only to the turn of the 
millennium (Issing, 2005). 
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communication instrument, a first evaluation of their usefulness is now in order. This 
paper analyses the case of the ECB’s press conferences, which have been part of the 
ECB’s communication tools right from the start of its monetary policy in January 
1999. Following the rate-setting meetings of the ECB’s decision-making body, the 
Governing Council, which typically take place on the first Thursday of each month, 
the ECB announces the monetary policy decisions at 13:45 (CET). 45 minutes later, at 
around 14:30, the ECB President and Vice-President hold a press conference (with the 
exception of one meeting in summer, where normally no press conference is held). It 
comprises two elements; a prepared introductory statement that contains the 
background considerations for the monetary policy decision, and a Questions & 
Answers (Q&A) part during which the President and the Vice-President are available 
to answer questions by the attending journalists.  
 
The paper analyses the ECB’s experience from a financial market perspective. We 
focus on two central questions: first, to what extent do press conferences 
systematically add relevant information to explain given decisions? And second: do 
press conferences provide additional information, beyond that explaining a given 
decision, in particular about the state and outlook of the economy? In principle, if a 
policy decision contains all relevant information for market participants, markets 
should not show any systematic movement during press conferences. The separation 
of the release of the decision from its explanation therefore allows us to separate the 
effect of monetary policy decisions from the accompanying communication. 
Moreover, as the press conference is broadcasted, and reported upon in real time by 
financial market newswire services, it is possible to trace the information flow to 
financial markets, and thus to separately analyse market reactions to the various types 
of information.
4 Finally, the Q&A session provides for an interesting tool of central 
bank communication, as it enables journalists to ask clarifying questions to the policy 
makers. The analysis in this paper assesses under what circumstances the Q&A 
session is valuable to clarify issues and the overall message of the press conference.  
 
The main findings of the paper can be summarised as follows. Overall, press 
conferences have systematically added information about ECB policy decisions as 
well as about the underlying state of the economy. In fact, the size of the market 
reaction to press conference is on average substantially larger than the reaction to the 
policy decision itself, while the press conference at the same time exerts lower effects 
on market volatility. The market reaction to the press conference is related to the 
characteristics of the decision: the less well a decision has been anticipated by the 
market, the stronger is the reaction to the introductory statement. This suggests that 
the statement contains relevant explanations for the reasons underlying the decision, 
which helps clarify the market participants’ interpretation of the decision. Beyond this 
explanation, no further clarification of the given decision is required, as on average 
the market reaction to the Q&A session is not dependent on the characteristics of the 
preceding decision.  
                                                 
4 This stands in contrast to the information flow for many other central banks, where relevant 
information on the decisions, such as the minutes of the meetings, are released to the media with an 
embargo time. In these cases, newswire services prepare a set of news lines that are then released to the 
markets simultaneously as soon as the embargo time has elapsed. With this simultaneous arrival of 
news, it is not possible to test the relevance of the various parts of central bank communication. 
Nevertheless, some studies have focused on regime shifts of communication practices at the central 
banks, such as Swanson (2006) for the FOMC. 
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More specifically, the paper asks to what type of information and statements markets 
react during press conferences. It shows that statements made during the press 
conference containing a reference to inflationary developments are strong market 
movers. Furthermore, responses to questions regarding rate discussions at the 
Governing Council meeting have substantial effects on markets. Other statements, e.g. 
about the economic outlook, second round effects, or money growth are important as 
well, yet not as consistently as those about inflation and rate discussions.  
 
Finally, the paper analyses whether the Q&A session, probably the most distinctive 
characteristic of the press conference relative to a press statement that is released on 
the central bank website, is able to clarify the views of the public about the current 
decision and the future course of monetary policy. It gives journalists the opportunity 
in real time to digest the information provided through the decision and the 
introductory statement, to compare it with their own prior information, and to ask 
questions on those issues that need clarification. While the Q&A session does not 
systematically add information beyond that given in the Introductory Statement, a 
clarification role is indeed apparent in the data, as financial markets show large 
movements under specific circumstances. In particular, we focus on directional 
changes in financial market movements during the Q&A compared to the reaction to 
the policy decision. We find that such directional changes are less likely to occur if 
the decision itself contains a lot of information (such as when it surprised markets or 
interest rates were changed). Directional changes are more frequent when there is a 
high degree of uncertainty among market participants about the state and outlook of 
the economy. Under situations of elevated macroeconomic uncertainty, the market 
response to the release of the monetary policy decision itself is muted, suggesting that 
market participants wait for the clarification provided during the press conferences. In 
line with this, the paper finds that the Q&A session is indeed playing a clarification 
role in particular in such situations. 
 
By looking at financial market reactions to the announcement of policy decisions and 
the surrounding communication, this paper is related to different strands of the 
literature. First, there are numerous studies that analyse market reactions to monetary 
policy decisions. Most of the work in this literature has focused on the Federal 
Reserve, though there is increasingly also work on other central banks, including the 
ECB.
5 This strand of research has reached a consensus that financial market reactions 
to the release of monetary policy decisions are substantial. 
 
Second, a number of recent papers analyse issues relating to central bank 
communication, reflecting the increased importance communication aspects have 
gained in the conduct of monetary policy over the last decades. Two recent 
contributions look at the intersection of the announcement of policy decisions and 
                                                 
5  Some important studies on the Federal Reserve, though this list is by no means exhaustive, are 
Thornton (1998), Fleming and Remolona (1999), Kuttner (2001), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), 
Bomfin (2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), Rigobon and Sack (2004), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004). Studies covering the ECB are Hartmann, Manna and Manzanares (2001), Gaspar, Perez Quiros 
and Sicilia (2001), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003). Finally, Anderson (2006) compares the 
reaction of long-term bonds and stock markets for the two central banks, and finds that, although 
financial markets react in both cases, volatility in the euro area responds by less than in the US, a 
finding that has not yet been well understood. 
9
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 767
June 2007 
communication, as we do in this study. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) decompose the policy 
surprises of FOMC decisions, and show that they contain not only an element of 
surprise about the current decision, but also about the future path of interest rates. 
Given the high degree of predictability of FOMC decisions in recent years, financial 
markets react predominantly to this “path surprise”, which can furthermore be related 
to the existence of FOMC statements, i.e. communication surrounding the release of 
the policy decisions. The same approach has been applied to study the ECB’s case in 
Brand et al. (2006), who also find that it is less the announcement of the decision that 
contains information, but more the press conference that provides substantial new 
information to financial markets. As we will do in this paper, Brand et al. exploit the 
fact that the ECB’s releases of monetary policy decision are separated from any 
further explanatory communication during the press conference. The present paper 
shares the finding that the information content of the press conference is large relative 
to the one of the monetary policy decision, and goes one step further by decomposing 
the elements of the press conference, and by identifying the individual pieces of 
information to which markets react and which make the press conference constitute a 
clarifying communication tool. 
 
A number of studies have constructed wording indicators to classify the content of the 
introductory statements of the ECB’s press conferences (Heinemann and Ulrich 2005, 
Rosa and Verga 2006, Berger, de Haan and Sturm 2006), showing that there have 
been significant changes in the tone and the message of these statements, in particular 
with regard to the initial years of the ECB, and the effectiveness of certain code words 
and phrases. 
 
Other papers in the literature more generally analyse financial market reactions to 
policy decisions and communication, both by the committees (Kohn and Sack 2004, 
Reeves and Sawicki 2006, Andersson et al. 2006) and by individual committee 
members (Reinhart and Sack 2006, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007). Research on the 
role of minutes has emphasised the relevance of timeliness in communication. With 
the expedited release practices of both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, 
whereby the minutes are now made public prior to the subsequent meeting, financial 
market reactions have strengthened considerably (Reinhart and Sack 2006, Bank of 
England 2005). Some though limited work has been undertaken on understanding 
how the media digest information provided by central banks (de Haan, Amtenbrink 
and Waller 2004 and Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2006).
6 Much of this literature 
analyses the effect of monetary policy meetings and their announcements; however, to 
our knowledge the present paper is the first to look in detail – minute by minute and 
statement by statement – at the individual components of the ECB press conference. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by presenting the 
data underlying our analysis. Section 3 contains the discussion of the empirical 
results, together with various extensions and robustness checks. Section 4 focuses on 
the specific statements contained in the press conferences and analyses how these 
have been priced into markets, while section 5 specifically investigates to what extent 
the Q&A part fulfils a clarification role. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                 
6 Related studies that focus on the overall role of transparency and communication for different central 
banks are Geraats (2002) and Guthrie and Wright (2000); or the impact of specific pieces of central 
bank and other news on financial markets (e.g. Fleming and Remolona 1999 and Andersson 2007). 
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2. Data 
This section discusses the main data used in the empirical analysis, foremost the 3-
month Euribor futures rates, the newswire and other data on ECB press conferences, 
and the proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
2.1.  3-month Euribor futures 
This paper analyses the reaction of 3-month Euribor futures to the communication on 
Governing Council meeting days, given the fact that this is the most traded money 
market instrument on this occasion. We have obtained intra-day data from TickData 
Inc. The prices are recorded as actual transaction prices on LIFFE on a tick-by-tick 
basis.
7 As these observations are unequally spaced, we calculate price data on a 
minute-by-minute frequency by linear interpolation of the two tick prices immediately 
before and after the full minute (Andersen et al. 2003). For an analysis of trading 
activity, we furthermore obtain the number of ticks recorded within a given minute. 
Furthermore, although only as of July 2003, the data contains information on traded 
volumes, measured as the number of contracts (over €1 million each) traded.  
 
The decision to calculate minute-by-minute data arises because this is the frequency at 
which we can obtain data on the news headlines by the financial newswires (described 
below). From the price data, we calculate returns as  )] ln( ) [ln( * 100 1 − − = t t t p p r . An 
alternative measure for the market evolution would consist in the first difference of 
prices, as the implied futures rate  t f  is derived from the quoted price by subtracting 
the latter from 100, such that  t t t t t t p p p p f f − = − − − = − − − − 1 1 1 ) 100 ( ) 100 ( . The two 
measures are extremely similar, with a 1% return being roughly equivalent to a 100 
basis point decrease in the implied futures rate. Finally, we construct a measure of 
realised volatility based on Andersen et al. (2003) as the sum of the squared returns 
over the relevant time windows.
8  
 
As is well known, such high frequency financial market data are subject to intraday 




2.2.  Monetary policy decisions and the press conference 
Information on the ECB’s monetary policy decisions and press conferences has been 
obtained from its website. The taped versions on the press conference on Bloomberg 
                                                 
7 Euribor futures contracts are based on an interbank rate, which is highly correlated with the ECB’s 
policy rate. The data generally refer to the contract with the nearest maturity. The switch to the next 
maturity is done by a procedure that compares daily tick volumes for two adjacent contracts. It 
switches usually around 3-5 days before expiration of the contract with the nearest maturity, when 
daily tick volumes exceed those of the old contract. This procedure ensures maximum liquidity of the 
considered contracts. For more information, see http://www.tickdata.com.  
8 Choosing a length of the time window over which realised volatility is calculated, and the frequency 
of the underlying return data, is subject to a trade-off (Andersen et al., 2003). In our case, the minutely 
frequency of the return data is naturally given by the frequency of some of the explanatory variables. 
The time window over which we calculate realised volatility similarly arises naturally, e.g. through the 
length of the various parts of the press conference. 
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allow us to determine the length of the introductory statement and the Q&A session, 
respectively, for each press conference. Due to data availability, our sample starts 
with the press conference in July 2001; it ends with the conference in April 2006, 
such that our sample contains 53 observations. It is therefore important to keep in 
mind that results are based on a small sample. Table 1 provides a few summary 
statistics for the press conferences in our sample. It has lasted on average around 44 
minutes, with 12 minutes taken up by reading the introductory statement, and 32 
minutes for the Q&A session. On average, there are around 16 questions asked in the 
Q&A session. However, all figures vary substantially over time. The number of 
questions posed, for instance, varies from 8 on August 30, 2001 to 31 on June 05, 
2003 (interestingly, both days on which policy rates were changed).  
 
Table 1 here 
 
As we are inter alia interested in market reactions to individual statements made 
during the press conference, we extract the real-time reports (snaps) released on a 
commonly used newswire service, Reuters News. As the snaps are available from 
Reuters for 13 consecutive months only, our sample starts only in September 2004.
9 
Furthermore, the sample ends in July 2005 (note that no press conferences are held in 
August), in order to restrict the analysis to a relatively homogeneous time sample, 
namely a period where markets did not expect any immediate changes in policy rates.  
 
As an illustration, Table A1 in the annex provides the snaps released on Reuters 
during the press conference in November 2004. Each snap consists of a brief 
statement, reporting about the main points made during the press conference. 
Importantly for our purposes, the time stamp is available for each snap, such that we 
know the exact minute at which the information reaches the markets. We distinguish 
the snaps according to their content, differentiating between statements on the 
economic outlook, inflation, second round effects, money growth and interest rates.
10 
The latter classification was chosen for statements that relate directly to the discussion 
on policy rates in the Governing Council. Such statements are never made during the 
introductory statement, but sometimes in response to a question (such as whether a 
rate decision was made unanimously, whether the Governing Council has discussed 
all options, i.e. increasing, decreasing as well as maintaining interest rates, etc.) 
during the Q&A session. From the snaps, we construct a time series for each of the 
content categories, which is equal to one in any minute where an according snap is 
recorded on Reuters, and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
A number of caveats of this methodology should be emphasized. First, newswire 
services may wrongly report or misinterpret a statement. However, as our objective is 
to assess communication from the perspective of financial markets, it is important to 
analyse the information market participants actually receive. Second, there are a 
                                                 
9 Alternative sources like Bloomberg or Market News International provide these data for considerably 
shorter periods only. 
10 Our dataset contains 530 snaps. Of these, 483 have an economic content (as opposed to snaps 
reporting that the ECB president opens the press conference or the Q&A session, or snaps related to 
topical issues other than monetary policy or the economic developments, such as central bank gold 
sales). Our classification covers two thirds of the statements with economic content. Snaps not covered 
relate, for instance, to global imbalances, or fiscal policy. Their inclusion does not alter the results of 
our econometric analyses. 
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number of newswire services that report in real time, and the press conference is 
furthermore televised. Accordingly, financial market participants might receive 
different information, depending on their source. However, a comparison of the snaps 
released by Reuters, Bloomberg and Market News International shows no major 
differences with respect to their timing and content. Furthermore, the delay in 
newswire reports relative to the televised version is minimal. Finally, to ensure that 
we are measuring the effect of the ECB’s communication, rather than other news, we 
control for the market reaction to the release of US jobless claims figures, which 
occur at 14:30 on Thursdays. We do so by calculating the surprise component 
contained in the released figures as the actual release minus market expectations 
measured through the median response of a Bloomberg survey among market 
participants. 
 
Finally, we are interested in obtaining measures that characterize a given policy 
decision. First, we obtain information on the decision from the ECB website, and 
define a dummy variable that is equal to one when interest rates have been changed, 
and to zero otherwise. Furthermore, for a measure of the surprise component 
contained in a decision, we employ the results of a Reuters survey among market 
participants, that is conducted a few days prior to the Governing Council meeting. 
The surprise component in the decision is constructed as the difference between the 
decision and the mean response in the survey. Of interest in our analysis is the 
absolute value of this surprise component. The second proxy for the surprise relates to 
the heterogeneity in expectations across market participants. For that purpose, we 
calculate the standard deviation of expectations across individual analysts 
participating in the Reuters survey. As shown in figure 1, this measure of 
heterogeneity in market expectations is highly positively correlated with the absolute 
surprise. In order to obtain uncorrelated regressors for our econometric analyses, we 
obtain the residuals of a regression of the absolute surprise on the heterogeneity 
measure, estimated in a simple OLS regression.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
2.3. Macroeconomic  uncertainty 
The final type of data used in this paper (also shown in Figure 1) relates to 
macroeconomic uncertainty, as we are interested in the effects of the press conference 
conditional on the macroeconomic environment.
11 However, macroeconomic 
uncertainty is obviously hard to measure. Our proxy makes use of the surprise 
component in macroeconomic releases for euro area industrial production, HICP 
inflation and money growth by subtracting the announced figures from market 
expectations (as measured by the median response in corresponding Bloomberg 
surveys). For each of these variables, we obtain the latest release that occurred prior to 
a Governing Council meeting, and use the surprise component contained therein as 
our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty at this point in time. 
                                                 
11 Gropp and Kadareja (2006) show that stock market reactions to news depend on the quality of public 
information. With lower quality, stock market volatility reacts more strongly to news, suggesting that 
better public information lowers the extent to which traders differ in their interpretation of new 
information. In a similar vein, we might expect that the market response to a monetary policy decision 
is affected by the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
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3.   The effect of the ECB’s meeting-day communication 
We start by estimating the relevance of the ECB’s press conference by comparing 
market developments on days of the press conference to days without a press 
conference (section 3.1) before turning to the specific market reactions to the 
individual components of ECB decisions and communications (section 3.2). 
 
3.1.  Relevance for financial markets 
Figures 2 to 4 illustrate how the 3-month Euribor futures market behaves on the days 
of the ECB’s Governing Council meetings. For each minute from 13:00 to 16:00, the 
solid lines show the average absolute return (Figure 2), the average number of ticks 
(Figure 3), and the average volume traded (Figure 4) on days of ECB Governing 
Council meetings and press conferences. For a comparison, the same statistics, 




Figures 2 to 4 here 
 
A number of interesting facts are apparent from the figures. First, there are clear 
intraday patterns in market behaviour. On both ECB meeting days and other 
Thursdays, market activity picks up considerably in the afternoon, which coincides 
with the opening of the US markets. In particular the weekly release of US jobless 
claims at 14:30 leads to a spike in absolute returns, ticks per minute and traded 
volume alike. Second, the effects of the release of the monetary policy decision at 
13:45 and of the press conference, which starts at around 14:30, are also clearly 
discernible. Market activity rises considerably at 13:45, and remains elevated for a 
considerable period of time. Just before the start of the press conference, market 
activity is roughly back to normal. The effects of the press conference appear in the 
data a couple of minutes after 14:30. This is to be expected, not only because the press 
conference sometimes starts with a slight delay, but also because it does not 
immediately start with information to which a market reaction should be expected: the 
ECB president first welcomes all participants, often informs about the attendance at 
the Governing Council meeting (e.g. if the president of the Ecofin has attended), and 
starts by reiterating what decision has been taken at the meeting, which is of course 
known to markets since 13:45.  
 
Beyond this graphical inspection, Table 2 reports the outcome of some statistical tests. 
Absolute returns, ticks per minute, realised volatility (calculated per minute, as the 
length of time windows differs) and volume are compared for different time windows 
on press conference days and on benchmark Thursdays without Governing Council 
meetings through simple mean comparison tests. The first column compares market 
reactions to the release of the monetary policy decision in a 10-minute window, i.e. 
from 13:45 to 13:54 to market developments in the control window on non-meeting 
                                                 
12 Days with a Governing Council, but without a press conference are excluded from the calculation of 
both lines shown in the figures. The comparison group is calculated for Thursdays exclusively in order 
to avoid that day of the week patterns in financial market behaviour affect their properties. 
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days.
13 The second column compares the market activity during the reading of the 
introductory statement – based on averages for starting time and length, as recorded 
on Bloomberg, namely from 14:32 to 14:43 – and a control window on non-meeting 
days. The third column provides estimates of the effect of the Q&A session. As the 
length of the Q&A sessions varies substantially (see Table 1), often covering various 
topics unrelated to monetary policy towards the end, we decided to cut off the 
analysis after 15 minutes. Such an approach seems also justified by the financial 
newswire coverage of the press conference: snaps typically become less frequent 
towards the end of the press conference. Finally, the fourth column shows market 
reactions for the combined introductory statement and the Q&A session. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
All four tests – for returns, tick numbers, volatility as well as volume – clearly show 
evidence for substantially increased market activity on meeting days, with all 
differences being significant at the 99% level (as indicated by the stars in the column 
“Diff.”). Moreover, an important stylised fact is that the market reaction to the entire 
press conference is substantially higher than the market reaction to the announcement 
of monetary policy decisions. On average, the absolute return reaction to the whole 
press conference is about three times stronger than the market reaction to the 
announcement of the policy decision. The figures in column 1 are significantly larger 
than those in column 4 at the 1% level for absolute returns and ticks per minute, and 
at the 5% level for volume. While being an important market mover, it is striking that 
the effect of the press conference is digested by financial markets in a relatively 
smooth fashion. A comparison of the realized volatility measures shows that the large 
effect of the press conference occurs with only half of the volatility compared to the 
release of the decision (statistically significantly smaller at the 6% level)..These 
results underscore the importance of the press conference as a central source of 
information.  
 
There is therefore clear evidence that the release of monetary policy decisions and the 
ensuing press conference are considered relevant by financial market participants. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is sizable. The average absolute return, for 
instance, rises by a factor of around three relative to Thursdays without Governing 
Council meetings. The volume of trade increases by even more – both the number of 
ticks per minute and volume increase by a factor of around 6 during the release of the 
monetary policy decision compared to non-announcement days. Moreover, press 
conferences appear to be a substantial and a larger market mover even than the 
announcements of monetary policy decisions themselves, while at the same time 




3.2.  Determinants of market reactions 
Having seen that markets react strongly to the ECB’s communication, we want to 
understand what factors determine market reactions to the different communication 
events on Governing Council meeting days. In the search for these determinants, we 
                                                 
13 All results related to the effect of the release of the decision in this paper will be based on this 10-
minute window; none of the results is affected significantly when extending this time window. 
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attempt to explain the absolute returns, ticks per minute and market volatility as 





t i R i R t R x y , , , , 1 , ε β α + + = ∑                             (1a) 
t IS t R IS
i
t i IS i IS t IS x y ., , , 1 , , , 1 ., ˆ ε ε γ β α + + + = ∑                           (1b) 
t QA t IS QA t R QA
i
t i QA i QA t QA x y ., , , 2 , , 1 , , , 1 ., ˆ ˆ ε ε γ ε γ β α + + + + = ∑                  (1c) 
 
where  y is either average absolute returns, average ticks per minute, or market 
volatility, as measured over the relevant time windows for the release of the decision 
(yR, 13:45-13:54; equation 1a), for the introductory statement (yIS, equation 1b) and 
the Q&A session (yQA, equation 1c), respectively. t denotes the day of a Governing 
Council meeting, such that t=1,…,53. When modelling the average number of ticks 
per minute, we include a time trend to allow for increasing market depth for this 
variable (which does not enter significantly in the other models, and is therefore not 
included elsewhere). 
 
For the explanation of market behaviour during the reading of the introductory 
statement yIS, we allow for an effect of the unexplained part of market reaction to the 
policy decision during the 13:45-13:54 time window by including  t R, ˆ ε ; for the 
explanation of market behaviour during the Q&A session (yQA), we include both 
residuals  t R, ˆ ε  and  t IS., ˆ ε . The introduction of these factors allows testing whether 
unobserved factors that drive market reactions have persistent effects also on the other 
time windows.  
 
Finally, we are interested in the effects of a number of possible explanatory variables, 
summarised in the terms ∑
i
t i ix , β . We distinguish between three types of factors that 
may influence the market reaction: i) the characteristics of the decision itself; ii) the 
degree of market uncertainty before the decision, proxied by realised volatility from 
10:00-13:00 in the morning of Governing Council meeting days; and iii) the degree of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. Turning first to the characteristics of 
the policy decisions, it is clear that markets react more to the release of the decision 
the larger the surprise component in a given decision (first set of results in the three 
panels of Table 3). This has to be expected, as a more surprising decision requires a 
stronger rebalancing of market positions. Heterogeneity in market expectations does 
not (and should not) affect absolute returns. For absolute returns, the relevant factor 
should be the market consensus, and not the heterogeneity in market positions. 
However, the more market participants had disagreed ex ante, the more diverse their 
market positions should be. One would therefore expect to see more market activity in 
this instance – a hypothesis which is supported by the significant effect of 
expectations heterogeneity on the number of ticks recorded. Interestingly, market 
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activity is furthermore rising in the case of changing policy rates, without any further 
effect on absolute returns or market volatility. The effects are relatively sizable. A one 
standard deviation increase in the size of the absolute surprise leads to 4.7 more ticks 
per minute (an increase of more than 50% of the average 9 ticks per minute recorded 
in table 2), in market heterogeneity to around 4 extra ticks (a 44% increase). 
 
While several of the explanatory variables are significantly estimated in model (1a), 
i.e. for the market reaction to the release of the decision, only few explanatory factors 
emerge for the press conference, i.e. the introductory statements and the Q&A 
sessions (see second and third set of results in Table 3). In particular, average absolute 
returns and market volatility during the introductory statement depend on the 
magnitude of the surprise component contained in a monetary policy decision – the 
larger this component, the bigger is the market reaction during the introductory 
statement. This suggests that the introductory statement provides an explanation to the 
public for the reasons underlying the given decision. Interestingly, there is no further 
relationship between the size of the surprise and market reactions during the Q&A 
session, which could indicate that the explanations in the introductory statement have 
provided sufficient information to the public, such that no further need for 
clarification in that respect arises during the Q&A session.  
 
Furthermore, returns, trading activity as well as realised volatility are mostly 
significantly related to the unexplained component of the release of the decisions, i.e. 
the residuals  t R, ˆ ε , suggesting that large market moves in reaction to the release of the 
monetary policy decision are generally also followed by large moves during the press 
conference. We will shed light on this issue in subsequent sections. 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows that while prior market volatility does not affect the market 
reactions to ECB decisions and to press conferences, the degree of macroeconomic 
uncertainty does. With increasing uncertainty about inflation developments in 
particular, the market reaction to the release of monetary policy decisions becomes 
muted, a pattern not observed on days without press conferences. The effects imply 
that a one standard deviation increase in the size of uncertainty about inflation leads, 




4.  The clarification objective of the Q&A session 
An interesting feature of the ECB’s press conference is its Q&A session, which 
provides journalists with an opportunity to ask clarification questions. This section 
analyses whether there is indeed evidence for such a clarification role, and under what 
conditions.  
 
Our empirical approach is based on the following considerations. In the absence of a 
counterfactual, i.e. an estimate of how financial markets would have evolved after the 
reading of the introductory statement, but without a subsequent Q&A session, we 
assume that market developments tend to be persistent, as it takes time until the 
arrival of earlier information (in our case, the information provided through the 
introductory statement) is correctly priced (see, e.g., Evans and Lyons 2005). Once 
new information arrives (in our case, the information contained in the Q&A session), 
17
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 767
June 2007 
earlier market moves can either be confirmed, reinforced, or reconsidered. For the 
latter case, the trend movements can either weaken while continuing in the same 
direction, or they can change direction. These possibilities are depicted in a stylised 
fashion in Figure 5. As is clear from the figure, both “reinforcement” as well as 
“reconsideration” become more likely with the arrival of new information. For testing 
purposes, the relevant question is where to locate the dividing lines between 
“confirmation”, “reinforcement” and “reconsideration”. In the absence of a clear prior 
on the location of these lines, the most objective criterion is the dividing line between 
directional changes and continuations of the direction of earlier market moves. Our 
hypothesis is therefore that a clarification role of the Q&A should lead to more 
frequent directional changes.   
 
Figure 5 here 
 
However, this criterion cannot identify whether the Q&A actually clarifies 
information, or alternatively just adds noise. We distinguish these two possibilities in 
two ways. First, by showing that market movements are highly persistent (as we 
would expect the reactions to noise to be quickly reversed). Second, by testing 
whether we can identify systematic patterns as to when the Q&A would lead to a 
larger or smaller likelihood of directional changes. If the Q&A was simply adding 
noise, no systematic determinants should be detectable.  
 
As a starting point, Table 2 shows that, on average, market movements initiated 
during the introductory statement are continued also during the Q&A session, as the 
absolute return measured over the entire press conference is substantially larger than 
during the introductory statement (0.018 versus 0.012). A mean comparison test 
shows that this difference is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.05. However, 
at the same time it is also apparent that there are instances where the market 
movement during the introductory statement does change direction, as the sum of the 
absolute return during the introductory statement and during the Q&A (0.012 and 
0.010) add up to more than the absolute return during the entire press conference 
(0.018). Importantly, the equivalent test for non-press conference days gives a 
different picture, where absolute returns during the control window for the entire 
press conference are bigger than during the control window for the introductory 
statement with a p-value is 0.01. This suggests that there is less variance on non-press 
conference days, or in other words that there are fewer cases of a directional change. 
 
Table 4 provides a more direct comparison. It calculates the relative share of 
directional changes. On control days, this occurs consistently in less than 50% of all 
cases, suggesting that market movements are indeed somewhat persistent. By 
comparison, on press conference days, directional changes are more likely. In 60% of 
all cases, the market move following the release of the decision tends in the opposite 
direction than the move during the Q&A session, which is significantly larger than the 
corresponding number on control days (namely 44%), at the 95% significance level.
14 
 
Table 4 here 
 
                                                 
14 Note, however, that this number is insignificantly different from 50%. 
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At the same time, Figure 6 indicates that market moves during the Q&A are long-
lasting, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that it simply adds noise to the 
markets (in which case we would expect that markets over time return to their levels 
after the introductory statement). 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
Therefore, taken together this evidence shows that the Q&A session indeed fulfils a 
clarification role as (a) the size of market movements are significantly larger during 
Q&A sessions than during comparable times; (b) the direction of movements is 
significantly different as the higher likelihood of directional changes indicates; and (c) 
market movements during the Q&A are long-lasting.  
 
As the next step, we want to know under which circumstances this clarification 
objective is particularly useful. In other words, we would like to identify the 
determinants of directional changes. To conduct such an analysis, we create a discrete 
dummy variable that is equal to one in the case of a directional change. We model this 
variable (for which we have 53 observations) by means of a probit specification, 
containing the same regressors as model (1) above.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Table 5 provides the corresponding results. Positive parameters raise the probability 
that the dependent variable equals one, i.e. that a directional change has occurred. The 
Table reports marginal effects, i.e. the change in the probability for an infinitesimal 
change in each independent variable (or the discrete change in the probability for 
dummy variable), evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. 
 
As to the characteristics of policy decisions, the empirical results indicate that for 
decisions with large informational content (such as in the case of an interest rate 
change, as well as for large surprises), markets are less likely to change their direction 
during either the Q&A session or the introductory statement. In a similar fashion, 
strong market moves in response to the release or the introductory statement are also 
less likely to be corrected during the Q&A session, as can be seen from the negative 
coefficients estimated for the various residuals. These findings are revealing as they 
suggest that the is less need for a fundamental clarification following communication 
that contains a lot of information.  
 
Turning to the role of market and macroeconomic uncertainty, the results suggest that 
the market reactions during Q&A sessions and introductory statements are more 
likely to lead to a market reversal in the presence of large macroeconomic uncertainty. 
The probability of market reversals is particularly elevated when comparing market 
movements in response to the decision and the Q&A session, highlighting that the 
Q&A serves as a useful tool for markets to clarify their opinions on the earlier 
decision. Importantly, no such pattern is found on control days, where 
macroeconomic uncertainty does generally not exert any effect on the probability of a 
reversal. The only exception suggests that, if anything, reversals are even less likely 
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In sum, this section shows that holding a Q&A session gives the public the chance to 
ask clarifying questions. There is evidence that this clarification function is indeed 
fulfilled by the ECB’s press conference, and both by the Q&A sessions and the 
introductory statements, as seen by the differences in market behaviour on press 
conference days relative to days without Governing Council meetings. The 
clarification role is in particular relevant if there is large uncertainty about the 
macroeconomic environment in which monetary policy is operating. 
 
 
5.  Real-time effects of press conference statements  
The preceding sections have shown that the press conference contains valuable 
information for financial markets. But what is this additional information that is 
provided during press conferences, or more specifically, to what type of statements do 
financial markets react? To investigate these questions, the structure of the press 
conference is particularly helpful, as newswire services report in real time, or market 
participants directly watch the broadcast of the press conference while at their trading 
desks. This allows to trace the information flow, and thus to investigate to what type 
of statements financial markets react predominantly.
15  
 
Table A1 in the appendix gives an impression about the way financial newswires 
report about the press conference. As the snaps are recorded along with a time stamp, 
it is possible to identify the timing of the information flow. As mentioned in Section 
2, we distinguish the snaps according to their content, differentiating between 
statements on the economic outlook, inflation, second round effects, money growth 
and interest rates. We create one time series each for each of these categories; if a 
statement is classified accordingly, the time series for the corresponding category is 
allocated a “1” in the minute of the time stamp recorded by Reuters. For all other 
minutes, the variable is equal to zero. Our intention is to analyse the reaction of 
absolute returns, ticks per minute and traded volumes to these variables. For that 
purpose, we will allow for at least one lag: if a Reuters snap is released towards the 
end of the minute, market returns in that same minute are most likely not reacting to 
this snap. Hence, even under the assumption of near instantaneous market responses, 
allowing for a lag is essential.  
 
We include data from 14:30 to 15:45, i.e. the relevant time window for the press 
conference, and estimate the model for all Thursdays in the sample period, i.e. from 
September 2004 to July 2005. Finally, given the intraday patterns in the Euribor 
market (as seen in Figures 1 to 3), it is essential to control for the time of the day in 
such an analysis. The regression model does therefore include minute time dummies. 
The model is therefore estimated as 
 
t t t jobless jobless t jobless jobless
i
t i i t i i t x x x x y ε δ β β β β α + + + + + + = − − ∑ 1 , , 2 , , 1 1 , , 2 , , 1 ) (    (2) 
 
                                                 
15 This stands in contrast to the release of minutes or a press statement on the central bank’s website. 
As this is usually done through previous circulation to the press, albeit with an embargo time, financial 
newswires tend to prepare a number of snaps, which are then delivered simultaneously as soon as the 
embargo time has elapsed. 
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where  t y  denotes either minute-by-minute absolute returns, number of ticks, or 
volume traded.  t i x ,  denote the variables for the different statement categories i as 
described above.  t jobless x ,  stands for the absolute surprise component in the release of 
US jobless claims at 14:30, measured by the difference between the released value 
and the median response in the Bloomberg survey. Finally,  t δ  denotes a full set of 
time dummies, covering each minute from 14:30 to 15:45. The inclusion of a lag of 
the dependent variable does not alter the results in terms of significance of the 
estimated β-parameters. We thus decided against its inclusion, as the model without a 
lagged endogenous variable allows for an easier interpretation of the estimated 
parameters.  
 
Table 6 here 
 
Table 6 reports the results, separately for absolute returns, ticks per minute and 
volume traded in the three different panels. Three results are reported for each 
variable, once for the entire press conference, once for the introductory statement only 
and once for the Q&A session only. For the last time window, the statements 
regarding second round effects and money growth and their lags were discarded, as 
the dataset contains less than 10 entries for these.  
 
The model comprises two types of controls, the surprise component in the US jobless 
claim releases and the set of time dummies. A large number of time dummies are 
highly statistically significant, whereas no effect is found for the US jobless claims. 
This might seem puzzling, especially given the spikes in trading at 14:30 on both 
press conference and non-press conference days, which are clearly related to this data 
release. However, it is important to note that the release takes place at 14:30 each 
week, such that the time dummy for 14:30 and 14:31 will soak up any increase in 
market activity that is invariant across all days. The regressor  t jobless x ,  contains the 
surprise component, which is estimated on top of the 14:30 and 14:31-effects. It is 
only this additional component that does not appear to affect the 3-month Euribor 
futures in any significant fashion. 
 
Looking at the response to the statement variables, there is clear evidence that returns, 
as well as trading activity, respond to the ECB’s communication. The most robustly 
estimated effect, which is found across all three variables and for all three time 
windows, relates to statements about inflation – not surprisingly, given the importance 
of inflation data for the conduct of monetary policy. Adding up the contemporaneous 
and the lagged effect, a single statement about inflation affects returns by around 
0.002%
16 (or changes implied future interest rates by around 0.2 basis points), leads to 
roughly 15 additional trades, and increases the number of contracts traded by 1400. 
Statements that relate directly to the discussion of policy rates in the Governing 
Council (which are never made during the introductory statement, but sometimes in 
response to a question) have also clearly identified effects, on returns as well as on 
both measures of market activity. While the effects on returns and number of trades 
are about the same as those for inflation statements, substantially more trade volume 
is generated, with an increase of around 2100 contracts (or 2 billion € notional). 
                                                 
16 Note that the parameters in panel 1 of Table 6 are multiplied by 100, in order to enhance readability. 
21
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 767
June 2007 
Finally, statements about possible second round effects, money growth and the 
economic outlook are found to be relatively influential, too, although the latter are in 
particular relevant if mentioned during the introductory statement, and less so during 




Press conferences have recently become an important tool for several central banks to 
communicate monetary policy decisions to financial markets in real time. As other 
central banks are currently in the process of revising their communication strategies, 
and with several years of experience with press conferences among several central 
banks, it is now useful to evaluate this communication tool. This paper has exploited 
the experience with press conferences at the ECB as a case study, analysing in 
particular (a) to what extent they provide systematic information in addition to the 
release of policy decisions, both about the decisions themselves and about the 
economic environment; and (b) specifically whether the press conferences fulfil a 
clarification role for financial markets. 
 
The results of the paper indicate that press conferences add substantial information to 
the release of the decisions themselves, often exerting an even larger effect on 
financial markets than the release of the decisions. The information content of the 
press conference is related to the characteristics of a given decision, in the sense that 
the introductory statement adds information in a systematic manner when the policy 
decisions are relatively unexpected. The main contribution of press conferences is 
found to be less an explanation of a decision, however. Rather, it is a more forward-
looking contribution that helps clarifying market views about the future outlook. In 
particular, press conferences are found to be particularly useful when there is a high 
degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. Under such circumstances, market participants 
are more likely to seek guidance from central bank communication, and show a more 
muted reaction to the release of the decisions but a larger response to press 
conferences, and in particular Q&A sessions, as these provide clarification. 
 
The paper has also analysed what type of information is particularly relevant for 
financial markets, using data of minute-by-minute newswire snaps. It is specifically 
statements about inflation as well as statements related directly to the discussion of 
policy rates in the Governing Council which exert the largest and most systematic 
impact on financial markets during the press conference. Also statements about 
second round effects, the economic outlook and money growth influence financial 
markets, though their effects are less significant statistically. 
 
In sum, the paper suggests that press conferences can provide for a useful tool in 
explaining monetary policy to the public, in particular because of their clarification 
role. Given the importance of a common understanding between the public and the 
central bank for the effectiveness of monetary policy, this advantage cannot be 
overemphasised. However, the focus on the ECB’s case in this paper leaves open the 
question how other communication tools perform in comparison. We leave this 
important policy question for future research. 
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Note: The figure shows data on characteristics of monetary policy decisions and macroeconomic 
uncertainty, with the latter measured as the absolute difference between the latest macroeconomic 
release prior to a Governing Council meeting and the corresponding market consensus (derived as the 
median response of a Bloomberg poll among financial market analysts a few days prior to the release) 
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Figure 2: Average absolute returns, press conference days versus Thursdays 
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Note: The figure shows average absolute returns per minute in 3–month Euribor futures, on days with a 
press conference (solid line) versus benchmark Thursdays without Governing Council meetings 
(dashed line), for a time window from 13:00 to 16:00. Vertical lines show the time of the release of the 
decision, the start of the press conference and the average start of the Q&A session. Sample period: 
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Figure 3: Average number of ticks per minute, press conference days versus 
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Note: The figure shows average ticks per minute in 3–month Euribor futures, on days with a press 
conference (solid line) versus benchmark Thursdays without Governing Council meetings (dashed 
line), for a time window from 13:00 to 16:00. Vertical lines show the time of the release of the 
decision, the start of the press conference and the average start of the Q&A session. Sample period: 
July 2001-April 2006. 
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Figure 4: Average volume traded per minute, press conference days versus 
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Note: The figure shows the average volume traded per minute in 3–month Euribor futures, on days 
with a press conference (solid line) versus benchmark Thursdays without Governing Council meetings 
(dashed line), for a time window from 13:00 to 16:00. Vertical lines show the time of the release of the 
decision, the start of the press conference and the average start of the Q&A session. Sample period: 
July 2003-April 2006. 
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Note: The figure plots hypothetical distributions of the autoregressive coefficient of market movements 
under two scenarios, i) the absence of new information (dotted line) and ii) the arrival of new 
information (solid line). In both cases, the mean coefficient stands at 0.8, indicating the persistence of 
market movements across subsequent time windows. With the arrival of new information, market 
developments are more likely to deviate from this coefficient. Market movements in the vicinity of 0.8 
suggest that the new information has roughly confirmed pervious information. Substantially larger 
coefficients point to reinforcing information, as market movements continue in the same direction, yet 
are strengthened. Substantially smaller coefficients arise if the new information corrects earlier 
information, leading to a weakening of market moves or even directional changes (with autoregressive 
















Figure 6: Price movements in 3-month Euribor futures contracts on press 
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Note: The figure shows the average evolution of prices of 3–month Euribor futures compared to the 
level of prices pertaining at 13:00, in absolute terms, on days with a press conference (solid line) versus 
benchmark Thursdays without Governing Council meetings (dashed line), for a time window from 
13:00 to 17:00. Vertical lines show the time of the release of the decision, the start of the press 
conference and the average start of the Q&A session. Sample period: July 2001-April 2006. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the ECB’s press conference 
Average Minimum Maximum
Length of press conference 43.77 26 72
Length of introductory statement 11.92 8 19
Length of Q&A session 31.85 16 54
Number of questions during Q&A session 16.36 8 31
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Table 3: Determinants of the market 
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(1) Introductory statement vs. release of mon. policy decision 0.472 0.466 0.473
(2) Q&A vs. release of mon. policy decision 0.604 0.444 0.020
(3) Q&A vs. introductory statement 0.491 0.406 0.140
Note: All figures are calculated for the actual time windows of ECB communication ("Actual"), and a 
corresponding control time window on non-announcement days ("Control"). "Difference" represents the p-value 
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June 2007Table 6: Market reaction to press conference statements 
Std. error Std. error Std. error
US jobless claims 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003 --
         Lagged value 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 --
Economic outlook 0.113 *** 0.025 0.121 *** 0.041 0.116 *** 0.034
         Lagged value 0.032 0.026 -0.018 0.042 0.085 ** 0.036
Inflation 0.068 *** 0.026 0.110 *** 0.037 0.036 0.041
         Lagged value 0.113 *** 0.026 0.143 *** 0.035 0.085 ** 0.040
Interest rates -0.026 0.046 -- -0.024 0.044
         Lagged value 0.231 *** 0.046 -- 0.238 *** 0.045
Second round effects 0.086 * 0.046 0.067 0.059 --
         Lagged value 0.199 *** 0.051 0.230 *** 0.074 --
Money growth -0.031 0.040 -0.068 0.058 --
         Lagged value 0.091 ** 0.036 0.105 ** 0.047 --
R-square
# of observations
Std. error Std. error Std. error
US jobless claims 0.021 0.124 0.021 0.124 --
         Lagged value 0.211 * 0.123 0.206 * 0.124 --
Economic outlook 2.434 * 1.256 4.313 ** 1.728 1.289 1.642
         Lagged value 1.518 1.285 2.457 1.779 -0.138 1.702
Inflation 4.048 *** 1.303 3.437 ** 1.536 4.353 ** 1.953
         Lagged value 11.013 *** 1.269 6.442 *** 1.481 17.419 *** 1.912
Interest rates 3.876 * 2.264 -- 3.970 * 2.118
         Lagged value 12.690 *** 2.278 -- 12.804 *** 2.145
Second round effects 1.738 2.249 5.782 ** 2.461 --
         Lagged value 0.263 2.513 6.814 ** 3.111 --
Money growth 4.704 ** 1.958 -2.393 2.450 --
         Lagged value 4.782 *** 1.774 10.549 *** 1.962 --
R-square
# of observations
Std. error Std. error Std. error
US jobless claims -2.357 10.737 -3.344 12.013 --
         Lagged value 7.576 10.642 0.319 12.012 --
Economic outlook 108.511 109.018 -93.337 166.904 257.596 * 138.142
         Lagged value 185.075 * 111.532 441.008 *** 171.869 -87.970 143.132
Inflation 610.865 *** 113.019 841.212 *** 148.379 215.775 164.271
         Lagged value 789.608 *** 110.108 692.328 *** 143.083 1046.833 *** 160.841
Interest rates 597.634 *** 196.436 -- 610.282 *** 178.131
         Lagged value 1523.487 *** 197.618 -- 1559.144 *** 180.417
Second round effects 221.290 195.183 442.567 * 237.714 --
         Lagged value 514.801 ** 218.013 861.098 *** 300.566 --
Money growth 59.832 169.928 -216.735 236.686 --


















































Notes: Results are based on estimation of model (3), testing for the effects of minute-by-minute 
newswire snaps on 3-month Euribor futures. *,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% 
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